Free Will and Metaphysics
Timothy O'Connor For almost fifty years, Robert Kane has been a man on a mission. While he has addressed a range of questions in metaphysics and value theory throughout his distinguished career, he has sought with more tenacity than any other living philosopher to clarify the metaphysical underpinnings of human freedom and moral responsibility. Kane began thinking about the topic in the early 1960's, and I think it is worth noting that era's climate of opinion regarding not just free will (something he frequently notes), but also metaphysics and the philosophy of mind more generally. While logical positivism was on the wane, empiricist suspicion of traditional metaphysical categories and arguments endured. Since that time, metaphysics has been re-born and is now flourishing. Most pertinent to the present essay, the metaphysics of causation and the ontology of mental states have returned as hotly debated issues.
The central theme of the present essay is that an adequate account of free will must squarely engage these more fundamental metaphysical issues-they cannot be 'bracketed off' in the way that even some contemporary theorists of free will tend to suppose. Doing so involves considering both empirical and philosophical issues raised by our fundamental physical theory, quantum mechanics, and how the processes it describes connect to the macro-level phenomena in the brain and mind. Interesting developments have occurred on this front, and Kane has tried to appropriate some of them in his thinking on free will. Some theorists have offered schematic models of how indeterministic quantum effects might be amplified in brain processes underlying human decision-making. More ambitiously, I think, has been the general re-thinking of reductionist metaphysics on which all macro-level processes are either identical to or wholly constituted by micro-level processes. Although scientific theorists' ideas can be difficult to interpret in terms of philosophical categories, there has clearly been some form of anti-reductionism at work in much thought arising from complex systems theory, applied to physics, biology, and elsewhere. In philosophy of mind, there has been a reappreciation of the challenge to reductionism posed by consciousness, and (more recently) the intentionality of mental states.
I agree with (and here assume) Kane's basic orientation to the problem of free will, on which metaphysical freedom consists in being the ultimate, reasons-guided causal source of an intention to act in the face of alternatives possibilities for action. Over the years, he has developed and refined a complex analysis of what the exercise of such ultimate causality consists in, an analysis that is intended to contrast with "agent causal"
accounts that take it as a conceptual and metaphysical primitive. I will argue, however, that when we draw out two metaphysical assumptions to which Kane's account is plausibly committed, we can easily be led to an account that is just a particular version of something like the primitivist agent causal theory itself. Put differently, when set within a plausible general metaphysical framework, Kane's theory and the agent causal theory are much closer than has so far been recognized.
I Kanean Libertarianism
Central to Kane's analysis of free will is the notion of "will-setting" or "self-forming" actions (SFAs). As many recent action theorists (and for that matter, cognitive psychologists) emphasize, much of our behavior is automatic, unfolding in accordance with entrenched action plans that are triggered, in some cases entirely unconsciously, by the appropriate stimuli, without any intervening choice, or active intention-formation. For example, you are in your car at a stoplight, thinking about the puzzle of free will. The light turns green and your foot moves from the brake to the gas pedal. However, the interesting cases are ones in which we do consider what to do and feel some pull in more than one direction. These might be overtly moral choices, where there is conflict between 'duty' and 'desire,' or choices between short-and long-term self-interest, or simply choices among a range of equally permissible and prudent actions that are all worthwhile from the agent's point of view but not all of which can be undertaken. It is these cases, Kane believes, where it is most plausible to suppose that agents directly exercise their freedom of will. They are cases when the agent's own will is divided between incompatible courses of action, in the sense that she has a plurality of "volitional streams"-complexes of beliefs, desires, and intentions-that are aimed at different ends.
The agent is trying to accomplish each of two or more incompatible goals, and hence is divided. He posits that there is an objective, non-negligible chance that each of these efforts succeeds. Whatever the outcome of this internal struggle, it will have been the agent's own effort that has brought it about, a choice that is both motivated and intended.
Finally, as Aristotle taught, over time, individual choice outcomes affect the relative weight of subsequent volitional streams, and a character is formed that is partly a result of the agent's previous choices. (Kane, 2012, 386-390) 
II Two Metaphysical Commitments of Kane's Account

Ontological Irreducibility of Mental States
Kane rejects the thesis that human persons are immaterial minds. I concur, but this negative thesis is consistent with a wide range of views concerning the nature of mental states. According to standard forms of both reductive and (putatively) 'non-reductive' physicalism, token mental events supervene upon (and on most versions, are identical to) structured physical events in the brain. They differ in that non-reductive physicalism denies, while reductive physicalism affirms, that they are type identical. Jaegwon Kim has argued in numerous writings (see especially Kim 1998) that non-reductive physicalism is an untenable position, in that it is unable to secure the causal efficacy of mental events. While there are problems with Kim's presentations of the argument, I
believe that there is a sound version of it (O'Connor and Churchill 2010). And reductive physicalism is obviously an unsatisfactory position for one who affirms a libertarian position regarding free will. A more specific problem than Kim's challenge for both types of physicalist view of mental states is that they appear to be subject to a Consequencestyle argument for their incompatibility with free will (Cover and Hawthorne 1996, 58-60) : for an arbitrary action A, let 'P' be a proposition describing each of the constituent micro-physical states and relations thereof that (according to physicalism) constitute my deciding to A at time t, and let 'Q' be the proposition that I decide to A at time t.
Plausibly, P and I have no choice whether P; and necessarily, if P then Q (by supervenience); hence Q, and I have no choice whether Q.
The upshot, I suggest, is that one who affirms Kane's position on the nature and reality of free will must reject all varieties of physicalism. Given an antecedent rejection of mind-body (substance) dualism, this result points in the direction of a metaphysical form of emergentism. Kane appears to concur (2012, 396), but we need to be careful here. The term "emergence" is used frequently in relation to complex systems of all kinds. It is important that we distinguish metaphysical emergence theses from those that are, in one sense or another, merely epistemic.
Conway's simple cellular automaton, the Game of Life, vividly illustrates that the existence of strikingly novel patterns of behavior in complex macroscopic systems is consistent with the behavior of those systems being wholly determined by completely general low-level transition rules at the fundamental level. These high-level patterns are 'emergent' only in the sense that one cannot-at least in any straightforward wayderive the patterns from the properties and patterns appropriate to the fundamental level alone; it remains the case that the high-level rules do not in any way modify or supplement the basic dynamics that drive Life's evolution. In short, the transparent simplicity of Life worlds make plain to an observer that epistemic irreducibility (in some It is sometimes suggested that there being metaphysically emergent capacities would be 'spooky,' not amenable to empirical investigation. But this is simply not the case. While they are basic features of reality, emergent capacities may nevertheless be fruitfully studied and eventually explained in detail in nonreductive fashion, by spelling out the basic inventory of emergent properties, detailing the precise conditions under which organized physical systems give rise to them, and isolating the precise behavioral impact their presence has on the system. Where we have reason to believe there are such metaphysically emergent capacities, it will be natural to suppose that they are caused to be by the object's fundamental parts, which have latent dispositions awaiting only the right configurational context for manifestation. If, in human beings, the capacity to form choices that emerges operates indeterministically, its existence and causal nature could be studied in more fundamental physical terms, even though its outputs cannot be explained in purely physical terms.
I said above that Kane appears to affirm emergentism regarding some or all conscious mental states, but the details of his suggestions concerning how things might go in the processes constituting freely willed choices make it unclear to me whether he has in mind Life-style epistemological emergence or a robust metaphysical emergence.
On the one hand, he suggests that there might be mechanisms whereby local microindeterminacies in relevant aspects of the brain might gets amplified, determining which of two large-scale competing neural networks that encode opposing motivational structures has its characteristic end realized in action (2012, 387; 1996, 130ff) . This is perhaps most naturally understood as a special case of a Life scenario: micro-level processes naturally result in the formation of stable structures that 'constrain' individual components, and the outcomes of these structures is determined non-linearly and in a way that is sensitive to small-scale and relatively localized indeterminacies. On the other hand, he speaks more generally of our exercising "macro-control of processes involving many neurons" (2012, 395). While not wanting to discount the potential contributing role of processes described by the former suggestion, I contend that it is crucial to the viability of Kane's claim that it is the agent herself that is controlling this outcome that the central determinants of choice be metaphysically basic, agent-level powers.
Causal Nonreductionism
A second plausible commitment of Kane's account of free will (and one that was implicit in remarks above) is a realist, nonreductionist view of causation. Consider the neo- happens in the distant reaches of spacetime, provide a bizarre account of a free action's being, as we commonly say, "directly controlled by" the agent, such that it was "up to her" what she would do in the particular circumstances. Our notion of agential control, and especially the ultimacy condition on freedom of the will, manifestly indicates something that supervenes on the local circumstances in which we act. Freedom of the will cannot survive a reductionist construal of causation, of which it is a particular form.
The best alternative to a neo-Humean reductionist account of causation is a neoAristotelian causal powers account. 2 On this account, the 'natural' properties of objects are causal powers-power to bring about particular results in particular circumstances constitute their fundamental, intrinsic nature. 3 Causation is the manifestation of such a power (or the collaborative manifestation of multiple powers in interacting objects).
Indeterministic causation, no less than deterministic causation, is the manifestation of causal power, though here the power is associated with propensities that are 'chancy' in the sense that the objective prior probability in a given circumstance that the power will be manifested as it in fact is is less than 1. These are propensities towards a plurality of possible effects, and thus propensities that are manifested in different ways on different occasions. Indeterministic causal powers are sufficient, relative to a context, for each of the possible outcomes in the sense that they are all that is needed, though not in the sense that they are a causally sufficient condition. Every indeterministic event is produced, though none is necessitated. 2 I here ignore the higher-order laws account proposed in different forms by Tooley 1987 and Armstrong 1984. There are well-known, quite fundamental problems with these accounts. 3 See, e.g., Shoemaker 1980 , Heil 2003 , Mumford 2004 , Lowe 2008 , Martin 2008 , Bird 2010 , and Jacobs 2011 . Some authors say instead-misguidedly, I judge-that properties of necessity confer causal powers on their bearers.
III Neo-Aristotelian Freedom
In the previous paragraph, I have deliberately elided mention of the entity that is the cause-that which exercises the causal power. Within the broadly neo-Aristotelian framework, there are two different ways one might think about this issue that have significantly different implications for how we think about the metaphysics of freedom.
According to the first, we should say that, in a given determinate situation type S, the having of a power P by object O1 at time t produces effect E in object O2. Or, perhaps more commonly, in situation type S, the having of power P1 by object O1 and the having of power P2 by object O2 jointly produce effect E. 4 That is to say, causes are events. The second analysis maintains, instead, that in situation type S, the objects O1 and O2 jointly produce effect E, doing so in virtue of their having powers P1 and P2 at time t, respectively. They jointly exercise their respective powers P1 and P2 to contribute to bringing about E. That is to say, causes are objects/substances.
Something like the first, event-causal understanding of causation is implicit in Kane's discussion. That is unsurprising, since event causal analyses of some form or other have been popular ever since Hume, and especially throughout the twentieth century. However, one may argue that the general identification of causes with events is a legacy of the Humean rejection of causal power and substance. Abandon these Humean deflationary projects and it becomes natural to understand causes as substances. On the neo-Aristotelian metaphysical framework, the world is fundamentally a world of things/substances, not events. Events are derivative from (constructed in part out of) objects. It is, in general, powerful particulars, objects, that exercise causal power, that do things in the world. To be sure, their acting in the ways that they do has an explanation:
they reflect the causal powers that they have at the time, powers that are none other than (one or more) natural properties that they have, and also (typically) the presence of necessary manifestation conditions. (I say "typically" since the phenomena of radioactive particle decay seems to involve no manifestation conditions.) So, for example, two electrons, eddie and eleonore, mutually repel each other, i.e., cause other to accelerate along receding paths at a specific rate. They do so in virtue of the powers that is negative electric charge, and in the circumstance (necessary manifestation condition) of their being a certain distance apart.
This description of the metaphysics of causation is natural within the neoAristotelian framework. If we accept it, we have a significant benefit for the problem of free will: the agent causalist's 'problem of the disappearing agent' worry concerning event causalist accounts of free will, such as Kane's, melt away. Since all causation is substance causation, then (provided we have a nonreductive view of agents and their powers, per our first assumption) unreduced 'agent causation' comes for free-it is not a fundamentally distinct variety of causation.
If all this is right, then a Kanean 'event causal' libertarian really is (or ought to be) a kind of agent causalist. I am, quite literally, the principal cause of my free choices-which choices involve significant macro-level indeterminism (of the right sort), dual rationality (weakly understood, requiring only that whichever choice I make, it would be motivated), and dual control (whichever choice I make, it be one that I bring about). Kane's distinctive notion of opposing 'efforts of will' is also compatible with the
